EthicsBowl.org

The NHSEB case-writing team deserves kudos for all the cases, but I especially enjoyed case #7. It enriched and challenged my understanding, and left me undecided on the issue even 24 hours after first reading it. Let’s see if I can make some sense of my conflicting intuitions.

Case 7 asks us to consider the ethics of outside influence in domestic political decisions, and offers three examples:

• Foreign activists influencing the 2018 referendum on Ireland’s constitutional abortion ban
• Civil rights activists (often from areas of the country outside of the South) advocating for desegregation and racial equality during the 1960s
• Russian-funded political ads which influenced the 2016 American presidential election

On the one hand, maybe the result is what’s most important. If we think that overturning Ireland’s abortion ban was morally best, the progress of the Civil Rights movement was morally best, and the outcome of the 2016 election was morally best, then we might welcome outside influence.

On the other hand, maybe we want each country’s citizens to make their own political decisions. Part of the allure of democracy is that it allows people to self-govern through the collective consideration and endorsement of laws. But to the extent that the legislative and voting process is manipulated by outsiders, the result doesn’t reflect the untainted views of the citizenry.

With the Civil Rights movement, one could argue (and the case alludes to the fact) that while Freedom Riders often weren’t from segregationist states, they were citizens of the United States, and since civil rights was a federal issue, their influence wasn’t external after all, or at least not as external as Americans influencing Ireland’s abortion policies, or Russians influencing America’s presidency.

The civil rights scenario is actually the only one with an uncontroversial outcome, for it’s clear that humans deserve equal treatment independent of their race. Abortion, on the other hand, is hotly contested, and so too is whether Clinton or Trump were better suited to be America’s president. Therefore, it might be best to set aside the abortion and presidency cases and focus on the Civil Rights activists, or to (possibly even better) consider a hypothetical scenario where the morality is less controversial.

Imagine European protestors opposing Hitler. On the one hand, we respect Germans’ interest in autonomous self-government. But on the other hand, it’s clear that Nazi death camps are unethical – in fact so unethical as to override our usual deference to countries’ citizens to self-govern. In this clear case, it would seem that the outcome is more important than the process, and therefore we’d endorse outside interference.

It’s questionable whether we’d say the same for less extreme cases – might want to defer to a peoples’ internal judgment when equally intelligent people reasonably disagree, as they continue to do over both abortion and Trump v. Clinton. However, you might argue that the stakes for abortion in Ireland and/or the presidency in the U.S. were similarly grave to those of death camps in Germany. One pits women’s interest in being able to end unwanted pregnancies against the value of a potential person. The other concerns the influence of a nation’s chief executive on everything from healthcare to Supreme Court Justice nominees to control of the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. Those are some pretty high stakes!  Arguably high enough to allow outside interference, only though only of the right sort.

That is, whatever your current view on abortion and Trump v. Clinton, imagine like-minded foreigners working to move American politics in that direction. When the outside support is on your side, it doesn’t seem as objectionable, does it? Or are your own intuitions driving you to defer instead to the integrity of the democratic process? I remain conflicted… But then when I consider outside protestors opposing Hitler, return to the tentative view that when the stakes are high enough, outside intervention is OK.

Teams, you have the luxury of a group of intelligent teammates and coaches – hoping these initial thoughts will spur good discussion. Should you figure this out, please share in a comment below – I need the help 🙂 Cheers, Matt

Case #5 in the 2020 Nationals case pool concerns a newlywed Indian named Nandi. Nandi and his wife get some big news: #1 they’re pregnant. #2 Nandi “has received a scholarship to pursue a college education at a prestigious university in the United States.” They decide to move, but promise their families they will return once Nandi has earned his Bachelor’s.

Nandi not only earns his Bachelor’s, but is offered entry into an impressive Ph.D. program “with the promise of full funding and the prospect of a successful and lucrative career.” He accepts, and after 7 years away from home, receives word that his father has died.

Per Indian tradition, since Nandi is the eldest son, he is expected to welcome his widowed mother into his home and care for her for the duration of her life. However, his mother is unwilling to move to the U.S. (which would require her to leave Nandi’s four sisters), and reminds Nandi of his promise to return to India after earning his Bachelor’s.

At its core, this case pits personal ambition and family betterment against broader familial obligations and the binding power of promise. Can a win-win compromise be achieved? And if one can’t, which decision is all-things-considered most ethical?

The second study question is a good one, asking, “What are the relevant factors Nandi should consider when making his decision?” Factors to entertain would include:

The impact on Nandi’s mother. Depending on his choice, how emotionally harmed is she likely to be? How severely would finishing his Ph.D. before returning to India damage their relationship? (With transparent discussion, could she respect his decision and be reassured, or would anything short of immediate and permanent return be perceived as an unforgivable betrayal?) Would she be able to live comfortably without him short-term? (For example, if she’d become immediately homeless and starve, this would be reason to return now. If she’d be materially secure and emotionally supported by her daughters while Nandi completed his schooling, this would lighten the moral scales on that side.)

The impact on Nandi’s wife. The case doesn’t mention Nandi’s wife’s preferences or interests. Would she prefer to live in the U.S. or India? Is she pursuing her own education or career? Does she miss or have additional obligations to her own family? Is her delayed return to India causing grief with her own parents?

The impact on Nandi’s child. Nandi’s child currently isn’t able to visit aunts, uncles, cousins or grandparents. The child is also growing up immersed in American rather than Indian culture (maybe a bad thing, maybe a good thing – those who know more about Indian culture than I do will have to decide). What’s the general quality of life – safety, educational opportunities, recreation – where they’ve been living in the U.S. vs. where they would be living in India? Does the child have strong friendships?

The time remaining in his Ph.D. studies. If only a few months, this would mitigate some of the negative impacts of continuing his studies in the U.S.

The nature and potential impact of his studies. The case details don’t clarify what Nandi’s Ph.D. is in. Nuclear medicine or basket weaving? Sustainable tech or bowling? To the extent that Nandi’s studies have a real potential to substantially better mankind, this would weight the scales in favor of continuing his studies.

Possible win-win solutions. Might Nandi be able to complete the remainder of his doctorate long-distance with a handful of quick trips to the U.S., or possibly transfer to a school in India? Depending on her age and health, might Nandi return to India, focus on caring for his mother for now, and then return to the U.S. and finish his studies upon her death?

Win-wins are definitely a good thing in the real world. However, as any team advancing to the nationals knows, ethics bowl cases are intentionally written to pit conflicting considerations against one another, to force teams to make and explain principled decisions. So while it doesn’t hurt to have a few dilemma-resolving solutions in your back pocket, know that judges expect teams to be able to make tough calls, and are likely to change the details to force teams to make a principled decision. For example, “That’s great, but assume Nandi can’t pursue his doctorate long-distance? Which considerations would win in that case and why?”

For HSEBowlers with regionals this weekend or next, here’s a thoughtful guest analysis on case 13 from our friend Michael Andersen in Washington state. Enjoy!

First, it’s important to realize that this is one of those very complex topics that you would be hard-pressed to research exhaustively with a full year of prep for Ethics Bowl; nor could you adequately cover all the relevant and significant bases that need addressing in a six-minute presentation.  So, I suggest that you focus on the strongest points for your presentation or commentary, and try to relax about all the other things that “could be said.” You simply don’t have time or energy to thoroughly research all the relevant perspectives involved. Because this is such a complicated topic, I have chosen to explore in this case analysis come of the more interesting (in my view) arguments on this case’s Study Questions.  Note that it’s not exhaustive!

Secondly, a note about my own biases here.  Having just recently organized and delivered a presentation series at the Fort Vancouver Regional Library on the topic of “Defining and Responding to Hate Speech,” together with the organization in which my wife and I are active volunteers (Circle of Peace), I have been steeped in research related to this case for the past eight months.  So, it’s no surprise where my own sympathies lie. To be honest, personally I can see no defensible justification for using violence (of the “it’s okay to punch a Nazi” variety) to suppress speech or to intimidate people, even if they are actively–but otherwise non-violently–trying to advocate for bigotry and systemic discrimination against or segregation of “vulnerable populations” (i.e., ethnic minorities, LGBTQ folks, etc.).  There are arguments for government regulation of so-called “dangerous speech” that I am sympathetic to, that would effectively limited where, when and to whom proponents of discriminatory or bigoted expression can spread their message (and still protect a healthy version of First Amendment rights).  If you’re curious, slides # 50-55 of our first presentation outline some of the better arguments of this view.  However, in general, I personally am a strong free speech supporter, and, it’s worth noting, this limited censorship argument noted above would not condone or protect suppression of speech or intimidation of people as the proponents of “Nazi-punching” seem bent on.  That said, the resource handout from our first presentation will point you to a list of good online resources for further learning on this topic.

Along with cases #10 “Belief vs. Action” and #5 “Old-Fashioned Grandparents,” case #13 “Is It Okay to Punch a Nazi?” asks us to think hard about our own moral character in response to a possible (or actual) situation we may find ourselves in.  To some extent, all thorny ethical dilemmas ask this of us, but the circumstances of some cases seem to bring out this dimension of moral character for the witnesses to, or participants in, the dilemma. The question What kind of person do I want to be? stands out in bold for this case.  

For example, in this case, it may seem expedient to punch a person who appears to sympathize with Neo-Nazi beliefs, in order to broadcast a “You are not welcome here!” message to that person and to other would-be racist sympathizers.  In an age ripe with memes on social media, where a witty comeback or outlandish action can garner thousands, if not millions, of views and likes, it may seem especially tempting in the moment to be the center of attention–if only to bask in the “glory” of our “15 minutes of fame.”  However, a bit more sober reflection should reveal that such a short-lived payoff is likely to feel hollow in the long run, especially when it involves you committing acts of violence that will probably result in painful, even harsh, consequences–like the prospect of violent revenge or criminal charges.  Is sending what you deem to be an important message on social media really worth being convicted of aggravated assault? Can this really be called “civil disobedience”?

Perhaps the most long-lasting consequence for those who endorse the view that “violence is sometimes a justifiable response to political views that one disagrees with or finds objectionable” (as Study Q#1 asks us) is the effect such choices might have on our personality.  Social psychologists have long documented how “[e]xposure to violence increases aggression through reinforcement, through modeling, by priming cognitions related to aggression, and through desensitization.”  Dr. Charles Sanger, Professor of Psychology at the University of Maryland, summarizes the research on how viewing or participating in violent acts in a social situation influences a later tendency toward aggression:

“…[C]ontinually viewing violence substantially changes how we think about and how our brains respond to the events that occur to us (Bartholow, Bushman, & Sestir, 2006). Frequent exposure to violence primes aggression and makes aggressive behavior more likely (Molitor & Hirsch, 1994). And viewing aggression frequently makes that aggression seem more normal and less negative. If we create for ourselves a world that contains a lot of violence, we become more distrustful and more likely to behave aggressively in response to conflict (Nabi & Sullivan, 2001).”

Of course, a more poetic and influential authority on this point is Martin Luther King, who wrote in 1967, in the midst of the Civil Rights Movement, “Returning violence for violence multiplies violence, adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate; only love can do that.”  …What kind of person do I want to be?  Surely, most of us want to be known–to ourselves and to others–by our capacity for love than for exercising our primal instincts for intimidation and violence (however righteous the language we try to dress it in).  If we agree with Aristotle that acting morally is a matter of habit, then we should investigate how to habitually act with loving-kindness rather than habituate more violent tendencies.  I concluded from my own investigation that the scientific research and the best wisdom traditions appear to echo this insight.  I encourage you to explore the topic on your own, even after Ethics Bowl concludes.

Beyond negative consequences for oneself, consider the likely negative consequences for our society more broadly if we sanction anti-racist vigilante violence.  By personally contributing to a trend of combating racism with violence, one will likely further normalize the unfortunate stereotype, “In America, we are a society that chooses violence to solve our problems.”  Boston Globe columnist Cathy Young articulated what’s at stake for us as Americans in her 2017 op-ed piece responding to a “nazi-punching” incident in Seattle:

“YET ANOTHER Nazi-punching video is making the rounds on the Internet, to cheers from quite a few people on the left.  The clip, shot in Seattle, shows a man in a swastika armband getting knocked down with a punch to the face as he tries to talk to the assailant.  Using violence to stop someone who espouses a violent ideology, many say, is legitimate self-defense. The man in the clip may or may not have been acting aggressively before the start of the video.  It’s also unclear whether he is an actual neo-Nazi or simply mentally ill.

Regardless, both the video and the applause for it on social media are disturbing signs of the times.  ‘Well done, Seattle. A+,’ went a typical comment. Another tweeter, a writer with 23,600 followers, declared, ‘Yes, I enjoyed video of the Seattle Nazi [getting] punched in the face.  Very much. Freedom of speech is not freedom from consequences.’ 

Twitter talk is cheap.  But such gleeful casual endorsements of violence are still worrisome, especially in light of what’s happening in the offline world.  One can feel no sympathy for Nazis and still realize that approval of Nazi-punching is likely to lead to escalation of political violence across the board.”

The are many recent examples of influential counter-arguments against the “It’s okay to punch a Nazi” stance–more than can be adequately explored here.  However, a few come to mind:

• One of the aims of The Dangerous Speech Project is to share the latest research on effective strategies for anti-racist counterspeech.  They summarize the following tips (among many) for confronting particular instances of “hate speech” or against persons advocating bigotry in public:
  • Remind yourself that behind each comment–no matter how hateful–is a human being.  Treat them as you want to be treated.
  • Don’t be hostile, insulting, or aggressive–it can escalate the conflict.

• The Southern Poverty Law Center, which has tracked hate crimes since 1971, recommends in their publication Ten Ways to Fight Hate: A Community Response Guide several time-tested alternative ways to engage publicly with those who appear to be advocates of hateful agendas espousing bigotry and discrimination:
  • “Speak up. Goodness has a First Amendment right, too. [But] Do not debate hate group members in conflict-driven forums. Instead, speak up in ways that draw attention away from hate, toward unity.
  • Create an Alternative: Do not attend a hate rally. Find another outlet for anger and frustration and for people’s desire to do something.  Hold a unity rally or parade to draw media attention away from hate.”

Regarding Study Q #2 and the prospects of “making racists afraid,” Jonathan Haidt and George Lukianoff, in their 2018 book Coddling of the American Mind: How Good Intentions and Bad Ideas Are Setting Up a Generation for Failure, examine in some depth the alarming growth in recent years of the tendency among self-identified “anti-racists” to suppress expression and justify violence on college campuses and in public forums against sources of so-called “hate speech.”  In their fourth chapter called “Intimidation and Violence,” Haidt and Lukianoff lay out an argument against justifications for this trend. Two supporting points include:

• “In 2017, the idea that speech can be violence (even when it does not involve threats, harassment, or calls for violence) seemed to spread, assisted by the tendency in some circles to focus only on perceived impact, not on intent.  Words that give rise to stress or fear for members of some groups are now often regarded as a form of violence.
• [But] Speech is not violence.  Treating it as such is an interpretive choice, and it is a choice that increases pain and suffering while preventing other, more effective responses, including the Stoic response (cultivating nonreactivity) and the antifragile response suggested by [progressive activist] Van Jones: ‘Put on some boots, and learn how to deal with adversity.’”

Certainly, there are some racists out there who are so fixated on their narratives of racial purity and perceived victimhood that rational discussion may seem futile.  However, it’s worth exploring whether you think it follows from these facts that our only recourse is preemptive violence against them. On a related side note, the situation outlined in the case, and the text of Study Qs #1 and #2, preclude us from equating these kind of anti-racist confrontations with our war efforts against Nazi Germany in WWII.  In the latter circumstance, Hitler and his armies invaded our allies’ lands, systematically looted them, and undertook a campaign of genocide against Jews and other political prisoners, violating human rights and committing war crimes on a mass scale. Unless you were a complete pacifist, at the time it was difficult to argue against our justifications to go to war against Hitler and his Axis partners. (…Of course, we weren’t exactly angels in our own conduct of the war, as any black American soldier in our segregated army would tell you. …But that’s another story.)  Confronted with the opportunity to “punch a Nazi” (presuming that you had reliable knowledge of his/her Neo-Nazi beliefs), you are not facing an invading army, nor are you dealing with clear threats of violence against you.  So, to equate the two justifications for violence might open you to a false equivalence fallacy charge.

In the situation described in case #13, both sides of the argument appear to agree that “[s]uch violence, in contrast, seems to be incompatible with treating someone else as a fellow citizen.”  Moreover, it’s relevant that Richard Spencer, the target of the attack, viewed that a line of basic respect had been crossed with the punch: “‘But punching like that just crosses a line—totally unacceptable.’ He admitted that he feared future attacks, saying, ‘Certainly, some people think I’m not a human being and I can just be attacked at will.’”  You could try to argue that preemptive attacks on characters like Spencer are necessary, because he (and advocates of systematic racism like him) are being hypocritical–because their message seems to justify violence against their targets. Furthermore, they are benefitting from the public peace maintained by civil society but would themselves violate it if they came into power.  Even if this charge of hypocrisy for a particular person could be definitively established, think about whether that alone justifies the preemptive attack.

This junction in the argument takes us back to Haidt and Lukianoff’s point above: that “speech is not violence,” and that a civil society must tolerate freedom of expression so long as it doesn’t violate the First Amendment limits set by rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court (or the equivalent in international law).  One key danger of equating speech with violence, argue scholars like Haidt and Lukianoff, is that campaigns to suppress so-called “hate speech” can backfire on those who are usually targets of such hateful speech. [If you need further clarification on this point, Nadine Strossen, Professor of Law at New York Law School and author of HATE: Why We Should Resist It with Free Speech, Not Censorship, outlines in this short (5:02) video what is at stake for this “hate speech”/free speech debate: “Should Hate Speech Be Censored?” The Federalist Society: POLICYbrief. For a counter perspective on this point (but one that falls short of justifying preemptive, vigilante attacks against racists like Richard Spencer), Must We Defend Nazis: Why the First Amendment Should Not Protect Hate Speech and White Supremacy, by Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, lays out the case that stricter counter-measures against so-called “hate speech” are justified by the damage such speech does to its targets.  In a 2017 interview about their book, Delgado and Stefancic said, “Our answer to the question, does defending Nazis really strengthen the system of free speech is, then, generally, no. Sometimes defending Nazis is simply defending Nazis.”]  

The heart of the legal debate briefly outlined above seems to be about whether censoring hateful or discriminatory speech through stricter regulations actually creates more problems than it solves.  By extension, the proponents of the “It’s okay to punch a Nazi” view seek to piggyback on the logic of the pro-censorship legal case and make it morally permissable (perhaps even legally too) to allow preemptive violence against racists like Spencer in order to induce fear and silence among them and their sympathizers.  (How exactly anti-racist individuals on the street would correctly identify and justly discern which so-called racists deserve this preemptive violence in practice is an obvious question that needs answering.) Furthermore, if it’s morally permissible to act this way in public, presumably it would be legal too; but how would authorities–police, lawyers, judges, even benevolent bystanders–manage to interpret such a law in reality, with all of the messy details such encounters are likely to involve?  Your job is to decide how closely the moral justifications track the legal arguments on either side, and to determine if morally we’re collectively better off by sanctioning preemptive violence against apparently dangerous racists–even when they are not acting violently themselves.  

As part of our third session of the FVRL series on Hate Speech, we summarized some of the powerful insights about how to effectively express solidarity or support for those who oppose or are affected by bigotry.  You can find some good resources in the session handout about this, and particularly in the recent Discovery Channel series Why We Hate, co-produced by Steven Spielberg (scroll down for the trailer).  To help you answer Study Q #3, the slides and speaker notes from that presentation summarize a few of the key points from this documentary series, as well as other insights from experts who have worked with targets of racism.

Finally, to echo a message we coaches have always tried to reinforce, we want you to think for yourselves on this and any Ethics Bowl case.  It’s not our job to tell you what to think. The perspectives I outlined here are undoubtedly biased by my personal outlook on free speech and violence.  As we attempted to do in our presentations at the FVRL, I have tried here to fairly represent the perspectives involved. It’s for you to decide how successful my attempts at an unbiased case evaluation actually were.  Good luck on Saturday!

Here’s a second guest case analysis from Vancouver, Washington HSEB coach Michael Andersen. Thanks so much for sharing, Michael! Great job once again, this time with some keen insights from the perspective of Virtue Ethics, and a nice quote from Ethics in a Nutshell (open source Ethics Bowl Edition available for all ethics bowl participants here on the Resources page) on Kantianism. And agreed that a good way to open a presentation on this case might be to concede its complexity — many moving parts.

Case #10 “Belief vs. Action” is one that we all can relate to, as we have all heard the saying “People should practice what they preach.”  A widely-shared moral intuition is the expectation that our leaders–especially teachers charged with guiding young people into public life–should strive to be moral exemplars (or, at minimum, not hypocrites); and we see it as tarnishing their credibility when their actions consistently and significantly appear to contradict their message.  But how demanding must we be of others and ourselves when, on principle, we advocate for more ethical lifestyles (in this case, that of living more sustainably)? Should only moral exemplars in this arena of life take on leadership roles?  

Surely our democracy and society can make room for people in leadership positions who are less-than-perfect, whose lifestyles involve some degree of waste and occasional excess.  Who among us isn’t habitually wasteful some of the time? More than likely, if our standards are too stringent, then we will attract very few qualified people into such positions.  So, to frame our thinking on this case, a bit of practical reasoning helps us see that our assessments of those in positions of leadership or responsibility should (within reason) allow some wiggle room for personal shortcomings and imperfections–if only because we ourselves are imperfect and would similarly face harsh recriminations, should we fail to live up to public standards of whatever constitutes an ethical and sustainable lifestyle.  We need qualified people in leadership roles, so together we have a vested interest in refraining from making such positions available only to those who are morally flawless.

When evaluating this concern, the virtues of authenticity (1) and integrity (2) rank high on many peoples’ lists, and adhering to our principles (no surprise) requires us to make sacrifices of convenience or comfort when the situation demands it (like when politicians who advocate for campaign finance reform have to disclose their own campaign contributions).  When people in leadership roles, or more broadly in positions of responsibility, behave in ways that seem to run counter to their message or role, then they risk being judged, by others and themselves, as inauthentic and/or lacking integrity. When the contradiction between their stated beliefs and actions is particularly embarrassing or egregious, these are often grounds for dismissing them from the position or demoting their role in an institution, as well as facing a general loss of social status.  

At the root of this contradiction-concern are some very powerful intuitions that our species has evolved to navigate our social relations with others, which help to form our shared ideas about the virtues of honesty (3) and trustworthiness (5) (or more specifically the vices of dishonesty and duplicitousness).  These concepts are crucial for our shared moral life together, as Kant argued (and Matt Deaton summarized) with his categorical imperative about refraining from lying:

“For example, imagine a world in which people always lied when it was to their advantage.  What would happen? Lots of things, but at root, if people always lied, the social convention of trust, which is based on the expectation that people generally tell the truth, would dissolve.  This would mean no one would ever take anyone at their word, and therefore there would be no benefit to lying.” (Ethics in a Nutshell: An Intro for Ethics Bowlers, 3rd Edition, p. 27) (5)

When Kayla, the Environmental Ethics teacher in the case #10 description, worries that she “sometimes feels like a fraud,” you could also say that she presently feels “inauthentic,” “lacks integrity,” or is “dishonest” by maintaining a facade of an environmentalist that–she feels–conflicts with the reality of her family’s lifestyle.  …It is worth noting in passing that Kayla’s moral character is developed enough that she is sensitive to this apparent contradiction, as she is (justifiably?) concerned what her students will think of her: “If students knew how she lives her daily life, they’d be shocked.” You might conclude that she deserves some reproach for finally deciding to accept the students’ invitation to serve as the adviser to the Environmental Club, despite her apparent contradiction of belief vs. action; but at least she deserves some credit for deliberating on the question in apparent good faith.  A good analysis of her situation will take this into account. 

Also worth noting here (very briefly, as it’s a complex idea) are the criticisms of Consequentialist Ethics by advocates of Duty Ethics or Care Ethics, who view as insufficient the former framework’s emphasis on consequences alone as the basis for moral judgement.  If we were to assess Kayla’s final decision exclusively by the merits of its probable consequences, ignoring completely her inner dialogue about the complexities of her choice, we would be missing something vital about her character and her process of deliberation. For instance, the case description tells us that “Kayla also knows that refraining from eating meat and dairy is one of the most effective ways to reduce her negative impact on the Earth.  But her husband and kids love these products, and it’s difficult for the family to cook two separate meals.” This implies that her choices about living sustainably affect, and are affected by, her relationships with her family members, and thereby constrain her autonomy somewhat–at least insofar as she can’t really disown or neglect her husband and children in her desire to align their lifestyle with her environmental principles. (While the case description doesn’t tell us, one wonders how hard she has tried to reasonably convince her family on this point, appealing to their shared responsibility to care for the Earth, and to avoid the charge of hypocrisy, given her public professional role.)  In the end, you might find her behavior and judgment lacking; nevertheless, a fair analysis of her motives shows that she appears to feel genuinely conflicted and yearns to do good in the world, which is evident when she concludes that: “Advising the Environmental Club would enable her to do even more good and inspire many more students to advocate for environmental issues and make a difference. Disclosing how she actually lives feels more honest, but it might undermine her work, making people take her arguments less seriously.”

Furthermore, regarding matters of environmentally-friendly living, judgments about personal authenticity and integrity can be tricky, as observers making the judgments are not always partial to private information.  Neither is genuine sustainability an easily-achievable standard to live up to. (6)  Given that all of us are enmeshed in complex systems of economics and infrastructure (usually not of our own choosing), and that psychologically motivating people to change is fraught with potential pitfalls, is it realistic for Kayla to feel that she’s a fraud because her family’s lifestyle falls short of what her environmental principles demand?  Should she actively pressure her family members to live more sustainably, even though this strategy might backfire, causing them to resent her or exacerbate their consumerism and wastefulness? Should she refuse the leadership role until her lifestyle lives up to her own standards? When exactly would that be, and under what specific conditions?  

Assuming that Kayla lives in the United States, her options for more sustainable alternatives (like convenient mass transit) and her reliance on a built infrastructure for energy, transportation, food, water, and other necessities is likely to vary, depending on where she lives; but probably her personal ecological footprint will be heavier due to these broader conditions of her life as an American. (7)  While some of these factors are within her personal control, some aren’t, and therefore our assessments about the degree that she should feel morally responsible for her lifestyle’s ecological footprint should take these factors into account.

On the other hand, compared to the small ecological footprints of billions of “poor” people in “developing” countries, and the hardships and sacrifices they live with, perhaps Kayla should feel more responsible to align her lifestyle with her principles.  One of her core intuitions is that “Surely an essential part of being an environmentalist is living like one.”  If this is the case, and billions of people already manage to live more simply, with smaller ecological footprints, then should the present circumstances of Kayla’s life–many of which are a product of her past and present choices–excuse her from the uncomfortable difficulties of aligning her beliefs and actions?  Perhaps not, and she just needs to stop making excuses for not trying harder. Surely people currently living in “developed” countries (like, presumably, Kayla does) have a variety of options for learning about and pursuing more sustainable lifestyles–for instance, buying vegan options at the grocery store, purchasing carbon offsets, supporting renewable energy sources, reducing their consumption of wasteful products, etc.  Kayla’s own specific awareness of the environmental costs of her family’s lifestyle reveals that (potentially, at least) she has access to educational resources and networks of people to support her transition to an environmentally-friendly lifestyle. (The case description notes that she has an “office” and that she works on “campus”; so it’s likely that she’s a college professor or at least a teacher in a relatively affluent secondary school.)

Perhaps most intriguing for this case, it is worth reflecting whether Kayla’s challenge is merely a personal one.  Given the realities of climate change, the environmental degradation we see around us, the alarming loss of biodiversity, and the mountains of waste our society produces, perhaps Kayla’s challenge is our challenge.  What do you think?  What do the facts of Kayla’s situation (and ours) demand of her (and us)?

Finally, the second study question asks us to think about whether Kayla has a duty to tell her students about her environmentally irresponsible choices  Should there be room for her not to disclose her personal shortcomings on privacy grounds? Would hiding such apparent contradictions between her lifestyle and her principles jeopardize her relationship with her students (and the Environmental Club’s reputation in general)?  Deciding what should matter most here depends in part on your personal moral convictions, but also on the quality of the supporting reasons and evidence we ought to consider concerning Kayla’s circumstances and her underlying motivations. The supporting reasons and evidence relevant to Kayla’s condition, to our shared ecological challenges, to the long-term sustainability of our way of life, and to the future of our planet’s biosphere deserve your close examination.  …Don’t be surprised if the wider context of this case feels dauntingly complex. Perhaps a good start for your team’s position on case #10 is to acknowledge some of this complexity before settling on an answer to Kayla’s dilemma that you judge is the most viable.

NOTES:

(1) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/authenticity/

(2) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/integrity/

(3) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/#Virt

(4) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/trust/#NatTruTru

(5) Ethics in a Nutshell: An Intro for Ethics Bowlers, 3rd Edition, p. 27 https://www.ethicsbowl.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Ethics-in-a-Nutshell-for-Ethics-Bowlers-3rd-Edition.pdf

(6) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sustainability(7) https://www.footprintnetwork.org/our-work/ecological-footprint/