Recall from Ethics in a Nutshell chapter 4 (review it on the Resources page here) differences between morality and legality. Good law tracks morality, but doesn’t establish or guarantee it. Just consider laws legalizing slavery or outlawing educating women. Surely it was immoral to enslave humans even when it was legal in the past. Surely it’s moral to educate women even where it’s illegal today.
Even meta-laws, such as a country’s constitution, aren’t a strong foundation for a moral argument. Your position is supported by the US Constitution? That’s cool. Did you know that document implicitly endorses slavery in Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3? Legal rights claims are tempting, and common, and would be very appropriate in a courtroom. But in an ethics bowl (or ethics paper), they signal that your analysis didn’t go very deep.
Human rights, which some claim exist prior to and even in the absence of a legal framework, are a little better. But not much. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains a collection of admirable, aspirational protections. But they’re all prone the same error. Check out the UDHR’s supposed inalienable human right to “periodic holidays with pay” (Article 24). A pre-legal, universal human right to paid holidays? Really? A case can be made that a life without leisure isn’t very fun. But a case can also be made that this doesn’t rise to the level of an inalienable protection naturally enjoyed by all humans, especially the “paid” part.
In addition to being fallible human artifacts, notice how even the language of rights impedes discussion. Rights suggest an all-or-nothing, on/off, absolute nature precluding balance and care, which does more harm than good when trying to think through a tough issue.
For example, if I claim a right to bear arms and you claim a right to public safety, and you think this supposed “right” to public safety is incompatible with private citizens owning arms, we’re at an impasse. The same is true when discussing abortion. If one person asserts a right to life and another a right to control their body, we’re (unnecessarily) stuck.
Invoking rights pretends an issue is fully settled and clear in light of some dominant ethical claim, and that one consideration (the asserted, favored right) dwarfs all others, when that’s simply not the case. Smart human rights theorists usually tie their claims to some fundamental human interest, which helps. But why not avoid the problematic language of rights altogether? It’s too coarse, too oversimplified, and not nearly nuanced enough for careful ethical analysis, including ethics bowl case analysis.
And if your gut’s telling you there’s some strong interest or overriding reason in play, explore the “why” behind it. Rather than ignoring rights claims, use them as clues. It’s far better to unpack the supporting reasons (if any can be found), examine and craft them into a transparent argument, than to invoke the lazy shorthand of rights.